The Art of Coercion: Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma 

Reid Pauly is the author of The Art of Coercion: Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma (Cornell University Press, 2025). In his new book, Pauly presents a fresh explanation for the success—and failure—of coercive demands in international politics. Strong states are surprisingly bad at coercion. History shows they prevail only a third of the
time. Pauly argues that coercion often fails because targets fear punishment even if they comply. In this "damned if you do, damned if you don't" scenario, targets have little
reason to obey. Pauly illustrates this logic in nuclear counterproliferation efforts with South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. He shows that coercers face an "assurance dilemma": when threats are more credible, assurances not to punish are less so. But without credible assurances, targets may defy threats, bracing for seemingly inevitable punishment. Packed with insights for any foreign policy challenge involving coercive strategies, The Art of Coercion is a vital corrective to assumptions that tougher threats alone achieve results. In this talk, Pauly will illustrate the book's argument with examples from US foreign policy.