Colombia: Is peace still an option?

The plebiscite on the 2nd of October in Colombia delayed the dream of peace for the country. The triumph left the country divided between supporters and opponents of the peace process. Sadly, the division is along economic lines –in rich regions the “No” vote won and in poor the “Yes” vote won; and along war victimization – in the regions heavily affected by war the “Yes” vote won while in regions less affected the “No” won. The extreme example is Bojaya, a town caught in the middle of a battle between the paramilitary and guerrilla groups in 2002 which suffered the death of 79 people and the forced displacement of its entire population. The “yes” vote in Bojayá was 95.8%.

From afar, an electoral win for the opponents of the peace process is unthinkable. Colombia decided to postpone peace. However, 52 years of conflict has left the country divided, with large swaths of the population unwilling to forgive and prone to populist politicians. Former President Uribe (2002-2010) lead an aggressive campaign promoting the “No” vote on the plebiscite arguing the agreement promoted impunity with lenient sanctions and allowing FARC leaders to participate in politics. The “No” campaign won by a very small margin: 0.43%.

History also played a role. Colombia has endured 52 years of conflict. During the initial decades, the conflict between left-wing guerrilla groups and the State was confined to isolated areas of the country. The little impact of the conflict on the urban areas, where the political and economic elites resided, postponed a solution. Illegal drug-trade in the eighties, the decision of guerrilla groups to move to the wealthier regions of the country to extract rents and fund warring activities, and the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups fuelled the conflict.

The number of deaths and civilians victimized sky-rocketed. Between 1985 and 2015, more than 220,000 people died, 82% of which were civilians and not combatants; 7.4 million people were forced to migrate (15% of the population); and 8.3 million hectares were illegally seized by armed groups.

Violence was at the doorstep of urban dwellers. Besides the large victimization rates, the negative toll on the economy became a new threat. Indifference from the elites to the conflict was no longer an option.

President Pastrana (1998-2002) started peace talks with FARC, the largest guerrilla group. In parallel, he invested heavily on Colombia’s military forces through Plan Colombia, backed by the United States government, but funded mostly by the country’s National Government. Peace talks failed and in 2002 the country voted massively for Álvaro Uribe, a candidate with a hard-line stance against the guerrilla. Uribe was indeed successful. Capitalizing on Pastrana’s massive investment on the military forces, Uribe exerted major military blows to FARC and pushed them back to their traditional and isolated strongholds.  In addition, President Uribe brokered an imperfect, albeit necessary, peace deal with the paramilitary groups, demobilizing more than 30,000 people. Uribe and his followers pushed for an amendment of the Colombian Constitution that allowed him to run for a second period, claiming he needed more time to defeat FARC.

President Santos, Uribe’s successor and ally, was elected in 2016. Twelve years of a continuous and successful war against FARC by the National Government had greatly debilitated the rebel group. The moment was ripe for negotiating. After more than four years of negotiation, a peace deal was finally brokered. The unthinkable after 52 years of war was almost a reality.

What lays ahead for Colombia is uncertain. We depend on the generosity and statesmanship that our political leaders have lacked so far. Reasons for hope exist, however. The peace agreement carefully crafted and negotiated exists and should not be discarded. The “No” vote won, but not by a landslide. The democratic mandate is clear. The National Government needs to renegotiate based on an existing script: the current agreement. The three political groups at stake had demonstrated some sense. President Santos respected the democratic result and is convoking all national parties to broker a solution, including Uribe’s political party. Álvaro Uribe proposes negotiating two particular points of the agreement: political participation of FARC leaders and a commitment of FARC members to serve jail time. FARC vows to uphold the bilateral cease fire and not return to war.

Reality may however hamper the good will. Some FARC fronts may not bear the uncertainty, while the profits from illegal drug trade are looming in the horizon, and may decide to go back to war. Hate, anger, and a polarized country may fire the flames of political confrontation, putting at risk the ability of brokering a deal. And President Uribe, whose final goal is to regain power in 2018, may prefer to linger the negotiation and erode even further Santos’ political support.

Let’s hope that our political leaders regain poise, postpone their personal political goals for some time, and prioritize reaching a deal. Peace for Colombia is still possible. We owe it to the next generations and the areas hit hard by violence.

Ana María Ibáñez is a Colombian national currently at Yale University as a Rice Visiting Professor and Senior Fellow at the MacMillan Center. Professor Ibáñez is a professor and former Dean at the School of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes.