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Food Sovereignty, Post-Neoliberalism, Campesino Organizations and the State in Ecuador

Patrick Clark

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Abstract

In Latin America the failure of neoliberal policies, and the popular mobilization of social movements against neoliberalism, led to the election of anti or post-neoliberal governments. This has opened up new political space for rural social movements to push for the institutionalization of food sovereignty in state policy. This paper analyzes the theoretical and practical challenges underlying the institutionalization of food sovereignty by examining the case of Ecuador under the government of President Rafael Correa. I present a theoretical framework by which to analyze the potential of the state to scale-up food sovereignty principles, which includes elements such as state-society relations, the question of the developmental state and state-society synergy. I then apply this framework to the case of Ecuador, ultimately concluding that the current policies of the government do not largely reflect food sovereignty principles. I conclude with some reflections on the question of food sovereignty and the state in Ecuador and beyond.

Introduction

The concept of food sovereignty (thereafter FS) has emerged over the past two decades as an alternative proposal to the neoliberal globalization of the food system by proposing to return more control over food systems to small-scale farmers and other producers (fisher folk, pastoralists, etc.). FS has grown up as a diverse coalition of actors at the global level through the La Via Campesina (thereafter LVC) and through a heterogeneous array of peasant (campesino) and rural social movements in countries around the world fighting for FS principles. Campesino movements have been at the forefront of this process, both opposing neoliberal economic policies as well as constructing alternatives to industrial agriculture such as agro-ecology and the social and solidarity economy. There is a growing academic literature which establishes the theoretical and programmatic principles of FS (Windfuhr and Jonsen 2005; Desmarais 2007; Schanbacher 2010; Wittman et al. 2010). Some more recent contributions have begun to analyze the concept more critically and draw out philosophical and practical contradictions of FS (Patel 2009; Claeys 2012; Mesner 2013). FS was established both in protest of the dominant discourse of food security at the global level as well as a framework of principles for an alternative food system (Patel 2009: 665). FS movements share a similar political orientation with the global justice or anti-globalization 'movement of movements' that grew up in the 1990s in response to the consolidation of neoliberal globalization and particular institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) (McMichael 2004). One of the main causes of the emergence of FS were neoliberal policies that reduced public investment in agriculture and policies that were favorable to small producers across the global south. A longer historical view would locate the proposal for FS within the literature on the agrarian question(s)

and the question of the relationship between national peasantries and the global political economy (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2008; McMichael 2008) or even more fundamentally in relation to the question of the “metabolic rift” highlighted by Wittman (2009).

The central driving forces behind the rise of FS are the processes of depeasantization that have taken place across different countries throughout the world. Neoliberalism has accelerated this process by fostering the further globalization of the food system and constraining the ability of states (particularly in the global south) to intervene in the economy in favor of small-scale producers. It is these dynamics that explain the calls for recuperation of control or sovereignty over food systems and food policy by FS advocates. Over the past decade however, the global context has shifted from the height of global neoliberal triumphalism towards a more ‘multi-polar’ international order. Many countries in Latin America have moved beyond the orthodox neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s towards what some authors have termed “post-neoliberalism” (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009; Kaltwasser 2011). Many have explained this shift by drawing on Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement”. Social movements that opposed neoliberalism have been integral in the election of left governments in the region as a Polanyian “countermovement” against neoliberalism (Silva 2009). The new left governments that have been elected thus represent a potential Polanyian re-embedding of the “self-regulating market” through the regulatory state (1957). Some of the strongest social movements that grew up in opposition to neoliberal policies and free trade agreements in Latin America during the neoliberal period were rural social movements, in particular campesino and indigenous movements (Deere and Royce 2009). The demands of these various movements were diverse, but they were united by an opposition to the ways in which neoliberal policies affected small producers, undermining their livelihoods. Many movements rallied around the alternative vision of FS proposed by LVC. In Latin America, these movements have been integral in putting rural and agrarian issues on the political agenda. They have also been important political actors behind the election of post-neoliberal governments in several cases.

Ecuador is one country which has elected a government committed to post-neoliberal policies. The recent history of the country has been shaped by the rise of powerful social movements in the 1990s, in particular the country’s indigenous movement (Becker 2011). Like Venezuela and Bolivia, Ecuador also underwent a constituent assembly process in 2008 to re-write it’s constitution with the broad participation of civil society. As a result of this process, FS was institutionalized into the 2008 constitution and then into subsequent laws and government programs. In this paper, I will develop a theoretical framework with which to analyze the question of FS and the state and discuss some of the theoretical and practical challenges of institutionalizing FS in state policies. I will then analyze how FS has been institutionalized under the Correa government. I argue that there has been a post-neoliberal ‘return of the state’ under the Correa government but this ‘return’ has had contradictory effects on the country’s social

movements that have fought historically for FS. There are some policy initiatives and programs promoted by the Ecuadorian government that reflect FS principles. However, in general terms, agricultural and rural development policy under the Correa government has been incoherent with the conceptual framework of FS. I conclude the paper with some reflections on FS and the role of the state in Ecuador and beyond.

Food Sovereignty and the State: A Theoretical Framework

The most challenging theoretical and practical issue for FS movements and for FS as a political proposal and an alternative policy framework is the question of how sovereignty is exercised. The dominant conception of sovereignty in the FS movement is a pluralist conception of localized multiple sovereignties. Michael Mesner has argued that sovereignty in FS can be referred to as “maximal democracy” (2008). This understanding of sovereignty is radically different to the dominant understanding of sovereignty, that of the Westphalian nation state. The modern nation state has been aptly described by Anthony Giddens as a “power container” - political power held within a particular bounded geographical territory (1985). Modern states have consolidated sovereignty over particular territories and intervene in or dominate the military, economic, cultural and social dimensions of human life within the borders of these territories (Taylor 1994). Mesner argues that in FS, sovereignty can be re-interpreted as “self-determination” over a particular “territory” or space in which ecological and social reproduction takes place. Mesner argues that in this sense sovereignty in FS represents a conceptual assault upon Westphalian state sovereignty (2013). McMichael draws similar conclusions; placing FS is part of the broader church of anti-globalization social movements which share this local pluralist conception of sovereignty. As McMichael states, “Contrary to the universalist conception of sovereignty governing the modern states system, these alternative forms of sovereignty express the particulars of locality/class/identity based relations.” (2004: 248). While FS is conceptualized as a political program advocating for a mode of production controlled by non-state subjects (farmers and farming communities, for example), it is also inclusive of states and is dependent upon the use of state power *against* the forces of global neoliberalism. While privileging pluralist autonomist sovereignties, definitions of FS also reinforce Westphalian sovereignty by making reference to trade policy, which is governed by states (Via Campesina 1996; Via Campesina 2007). It is here where there is a central conceptual incoherence in FS: the question of how sovereignty is contained and exercised and the relationship between the state and ‘particular’ or community-based sovereignties. The broader debate in political philosophy between liberalism and communitarianism is beyond the scope of this paper, but merits further analysis in relation to FS. Claeys has argued that FS is conceptually incoherent with where it falls in terms of the liberal/ communitarian debate (Claeys 2012: 452)¹. I would argue that the way sovereignty is understood in FS puts it into the communitarian camp, with the emphasis of FS on shared conceptions and principles such as local control and

agro ecology as ‘the good’ and as the basis for political legitimacy. In this sense FS is plural but it is not necessarily liberal, as the shared ideal communitarian ideal of the ‘the good’ conflicts with the liberal Rawlsian (1971) conception of the state as a ‘neutral broker’ between different cosmologies and interests. Corporate agri-business is part of society after all as well and it has no place in the framework proposed by FS.

The fundamental problem with the sovereignty favored in the FS framework is the question of how local and community-based sovereignties (of indigenous communities, farmer’s associations, producer cooperatives, community seed banks, etc.) are ‘guaranteed’ and exercised in practical terms. Raj Patel (2009) concurs that sovereignty is conceptualized as plural in FS and argues that by pluralizing rights and sovereignty, FS does not specify *how* these new plural sovereignties can be “contained” and exercised. As Patel states,

“Food sovereignty has its own geographies, one determined by specific histories and contours of resistance. To demand a space of food sovereignty is to demand specific arrangements to govern territory and space. At the end of the day, the power of rights-talk is that rights imply a particular burden on a specified entity – the state. In blowing apart the notion that the state has a paramount authority, by pointing to the multivalent hierarchies of power and control that exists within the world food system, food sovereignty paradoxically displaces one sovereign, but remains silent about the others.” (2009: 668).

One contribution that has pointed to a solution to this problem is that of Wittman and her concept of “agrarian citizenship”, which I will return to in the conclusion (2009: 807). Wittman’s concept points in the right direction with its emphasis on the state guaranteeing communitarian rights and sovereignties. However, there are some difficult questions that further theorization and empirical research on FS will have to address and which I will only scratch the surface of in this paper with my analysis of the Ecuadorian case. Such questions include: how might sovereignty be exercised over particular sites which may or may not overlap or be recognized by the modern Westphalian state? How can FS be enacted or “contained” within the context of plural, often overlapping and even competing sovereignties? And finally, what are the possibilities for institutionalizing this alternative vision of plural sovereignty within the state or having the state guarantee the sovereignty over these spaces?

In spite of these conceptual problems, FS has emerged as a rallying cry and political proposal of social movements demanding change through the state in a number of different countries. In several cases it has now been institutionalized in state policy. This necessitates a rethink of the relationship between the state and agriculture in light of FS. The relationship between the state and agriculture is complex and is characterized by a contradictory and uneven history between national economies and between the global south and global north. The original agrarian

question centers on the relationship between the peasantry and the development of capitalism (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2008). Since the rise of capitalism, Akram-Lodhi and Kay argue that the central issue confronting the peasantry is that they do "...not produce everything they need for their livelihood. As a consequence peasants do not live in isolation from wider social and economic forces that are outside their control, rather they are subordinated to those wider social and economic forces..." (2009: 3). There has been a long series of debates between economic liberals, Marxists and pro-peasant thinkers on this agrarian question and what the appropriate relationship between the agriculture, capital accumulation and the state is and should be (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2008). The distinctly pro-peasant perspective in this debate was developed by the agricultural economist A.V. Chayanov in Russia during the years just after the Russian Revolution (Chayanov 1974; Thorner et al. 1986). Chayanov was neither a Marxist nor a liberal but favored the "family economy" of household or subsistence agriculture which he argued in practice coexists with commodity production (1986). Chayanov developed a program to develop Russian agriculture with peasant production as its base, using cooperative schemes between farmers to solve issues of scale and the aggregation of production (Thorner et al. 1986). Chayanov's model was an alternative to Marxist collectivization and capitalist agriculture emphasizing the family and communitarian economy. Scholars of rural development have laid out autonomous rural development strategies which build on Chayanov's theoretical foundations favoring peasant agriculture (Barkin 2002; van der Ploeg 2013). This autonomist pro-peasant perspective underlies many of the theoretical and conceptual elements of FS.

At certain moments in history, often under pressure from peasant constituencies, state policies have been implemented which 'protect' or favor peasant production or small producers. McMichael argues that the Polanyian dynamic of the double movement culminated in the 'protection' of agriculture in the global north with the provision of state subsidies to family farmers and agri-business alike (McMichael 2008: 208). Though McMichael argues that this dynamic also resulted in some pro-peasant policies in the national developmental period of the 1950s and 1960s in the global south, this was not widespread and the more dominant trend was towards depeasantization and large-scale industrial production (2008: 209). This is a trend that has intensified with the retreat of the state in the neoliberal period and the expansion of free trade policies affecting agricultural trade (Rosset 2006). The debate about the disappearance of the peasantry is beyond the scope of this paper, however I generally agree with the position that peasants adapt with new livelihood strategies to the changes in the global political economy (Holt-Gimenez 2006). At the same time this doesn't mean that depeasantization isn't occurring as these global changes often transform social relations and undermine traditional practices and forms of community organization. Bernstein is also correct in observing that there are practically no peasants in the world today who simply survive through subsistence self-reproduction and are not linked in one way or another to commodity

production and capitalism (2010). Chayanov himself recognized that subsistence reproduction was mixed in practice with commodity production (Thorner et al. 1986). State policies across the global north and south have generally not been favorable to the peasantry or family farmers and thus even if peasants adapt and diversify their livelihood strategies, processes of depeasantization are continuing around the world. At the same time it is not inconceivable that state policies could be adapted to Chayanov's theoretical foundations and states could adopt policies that are more pro-peasant and reflect to some degree the principles of FS. This is why advocates of FS have pushed state institutions to adopt the FS framework.

In the neoliberal period, the state retrenched from many parts of social and economic life. This paralleled the shift in international politics from the 1960s-1970s period, which Patel defines as the height of Third World power at the global level and within the UN system to the dawning global neoliberalism (2009: 664). Neoliberal globalization reduced potential of progressive political parties and social movements to capture state power either through reformist or revolutionary means. Under neoliberalism, many social movements turned towards autonomist organization and strategies with a discourse of local autonomy in the face of globalization reflecting the 'think global act local strategy' (Adams and Starr: 2003; Ayres and Bosia 2011). This perspective has been expressed by social movement theorist John Holloway in his book, *Changing the World Without Taking Power* (2002) which argues that social movements should construct power and alternatives outside of state structures rather than fighting within the state or to take state power. The global justice 'movement of movements' has favored a strategy of transnational organizing and resistance in light of the consolidation of corporate power transnationally. Like LVC, the World Social Forum (WSF) has been an important space of articulation for the global justice movement. De Sousa Santos argues that the WSF has allowed for a wide variety of activists with different cosmologies to come together and learn from one another. Global forums such as the WSF have forced those from the 'old left' or western Marxist and social democratic traditions to question their own paradigms and appreciate diverse ways of viewing the world. As de Sousa Santos states, this exchange of perspectives is key as "there will be no global social justice without global cognitive justice...our time is witnessing the final crisis of the hegemony of the socio-cultural paradigm of Western modernity and that, therefore, it is a time of paradigmatic transition" (2008: 250-251). The recognition of different cosmologies is critical to developing new ways of thinking about, and doing, the political organizing and the construction of alternative proposals required for the transformation of neoliberal globalization. Like the WSF, LVC reflects these "big tent politics" as a heterogeneous coalition of national level organizations that includes diverse worldviews and cosmologies (Patel 2009: 666). However, as de Sousa Santos admits, the, "...dark side of diversity and multiplicity is fragmentation and atomization." (2008: 262). This multiplicity of strategies and proposals of how neoliberal globalization might be transformed means that is no clear or coherent alternative or strategy of "counter-power" (2008). In the same article, de

Sousa Santos quotes Hugo Chavez, who when he addressed the WSF when it was held in Caracas in 2006 remarked, “We must have a strategy of ‘counter-power. We, the social movements and political movements, must be able to move into spaces of power at the local, national, and regional level.” (2008: 265). As the election of post-neoliberal governments in Latin America demonstrates, autonomous local and global transnational social movements are not the only response to neoliberal globalization. The national level is still a terrain of political contestation and transformation for anti-neoliberal politics and concepts such as FS even if there are limitations to what can be achieved at the national level.

With the failure of neoliberal policies there has been a movement towards post-neoliberalism in Latin America. The case of the Correa government in Ecuador and its ‘Citizen’s Revolution’ is one example of a state in the global south that is staking out policy space under the changing contours of neoliberal globalization and the shift towards a more multi-polar international order. It is helpful to understand the ‘return of the state’ in Ecuador as a challenge to global neoliberalism vis-à-vis the nation state. The global justice movement has favored the global/local strategy as the nation state was largely not conceptualized as a practical site for struggle and reform in the context of global neoliberalism. This perspective of critical scholars in the IPE literature on the national state as a futile level of resistance is most famously articulated by Hardt and Negri in their book *Empire* (2000). William Robinson largely agrees with Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of the state and global capitalism as mutually reinforcing under the hegemony of neoliberal globalism. However, Robinson admits that one of the potential sites of counter-hegemonic resistance to global neoliberalism are, “Progressive elites and nationalist groups in Third World countries...” (2005: 571). Hirst and Thompson take an alternate view to the global-local perspective by highlighting the continued role of states in the era of globalization (2002). They also predict the ‘return of the state’ and the deceleration of globalization due to the need to manage the dislocations caused by neoliberal globalization (Hirst and Thompson 2002: 254). Hirst and Thompson argue that neoliberal globalization is approaching its limits and predict that the role of national governments will be progressively recuperated in order to manage many of the problems that neoliberal globalization has generated in national economies and societies (2002). If the financial bailouts by national governments across the global north that preceded the 2008 crash and the rise of post-neoliberalism across Latin America are any indicators, Hirst and Thompson’s prediction may be coming to pass. This forces these global justice social movements to re-think how they engage with the state and national level politics.

What are the prospects for FS through the state policy in the context of post-neoliberalism then? I believe that the state is both part of the problem and the solution for achieving greater FS. Currently, the state is an obstacle to the achievement of FS in most national contexts because state power has been used to impose neoliberal policies and constructed what

McMichael calls the “global corporate food regime” (2005). In particular states have been integral to the development of industrial agriculture and the maintenance of industrial agriculture, in particular during Friedmann and McMichael’s “second food regime” (1989). The role of the state has continued to be important in the promotion of agro-industrial technologies in Latin America during the neoliberal period as well (Otero: 2012). However without transforming the Westphalian state system and global capitalism, in the short to medium term widespread change in the direction of FS will require a change in the way state power is used and the kinds of policies that states implement. Within the current global political economy it is also very unlikely that the kind of autonomous development models favored by LVC will expand without both state protections from unrestricted free trade policies and supportive developmental policies for FS schemes at the local and national levels. As Kay states, “For an autonomous development strategy to succeed, major state supportive policies are required, such as specifically targeted protectionist measures to counteract the distortions in the world food market arising from subsidies to farmers in developed countries.” (2006: 474). The ability of states to implement such measures on a wide scale requires an “alternative globalization” and global governance along non-neoliberal lines (Evans 2008). In essence, for FS to be fostered vis-à-vis the state there needs to be more national policy space to protect national agriculture and rural development programs favoring FS principles.

Even as FS is conceptualized as plural sovereignty and achieving autonomy from illegitimate (or neoliberal) state power, the definitions of FS have also been inclusive of the state, as state power is still the only practical means to reverse neoliberal trade policies. However, the question of the national level has generally been understudied and under theorized in the FS literature to date. Otero argues that much of academic literature on FS have overemphasized the global dimensions of FS. As Otero states, for the constituent national organizations of LVC the “...objects of struggle are primarily their national state and the state’s involvement in local-level legislation as well as in international regulations promoted and enacted by supranational organizations.” (2012: 284). It is telling that in the case of Ecuador rural social movements have dedicated most of their efforts to formal politics and influencing policy change as well as opposing free trade agreements and developing alternatives such as agro-ecology and the social and solidarity economy outside of the state. The question then becomes how state power, and public policy, can be marshaled in favor of FS principles? In the context of post-neoliberalism in Ecuador and Latin America this is the opportunity and challenge that presents itself for these movements. For the state to foster FS there are a series of preconditions or elements that I believe must be considered. First, social movements need to build the political and social power to affect state policy. Second, there need to be developmental policies favoring FS principles. Finally new, more participatory ways of implementing public policies for FS must be developed. In order to conceptualize how FS and the state might converge in this context, it is useful to consider insights from the academic literature on the state-society

relations, the developmental state and state-society synergy. I will use this literature to analyze the Ecuadorian case but it is my hope that by bringing together these different bodies of literature could serve as a basis for further research on FS and the state by others.

Rural social movements for FS interact with the state in many ways and in order to analyze these interactions it is useful to look at the literature on contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) as well as the relationship between social movements and electoral politics (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). This literature emphasizes the fluid relationship between the state and society in the way social movements shape formal politics. It also emphasizes the fact that the social and political power is built outside of the state and this is key as the kinds of changes that would be a precondition to greater FS would require high levels of social and political pressure and mobilization. Building the political power to secure institutional change is the first step to achieving FS vis-à-vis the state though. It is also important to consider the political dynamics that accompany institutionalization. Jonathon Fox's concept of the "sandwich strategy" describes the tension and synergy between organized peasants and progressive bureaucrats within the state in the case a pro-peasant rural development program in Mexico (1993). Borras's "Bibingka Strategy" the combination of well-organized peasant groups and the opening up political space through new laws in achieving contentious land reform in the Philippines (1998). Both of these cases also speak to the fluid relationship between social power and power within the state. The question of state-society relations is linked more broadly to the question of the developmental state, which I argue is important to rethink in relation to FS and the state as at the end of the day large-scale transformation in favor of FS would require some top-down action by the state. Within the literature on the developmental state there are cases where states have been successful in promoting social and economic transformation, cases where states have been unsuccessful and cases where state power has been used in highly destructive or detrimental ways. Peter Evans' 1995 book *Embedded Autonomy* is an important contribution to theorizing the role of states in economic development. Evans argues that the combination of a robust civil society or private sector together with a coherent and non-corrupt state apparatus explain successful cases of state-led development. James C. Scott is more critical of the developmental state in his book *Seeing like a State* (1998), highlighting cases where developmental state policies were unsuccessful and even disastrous. Scott argues that many well-intentioned state interventions which impose one-size-fits-all models as examples of "high modernism" fail because they don't take into account the importance of local realities and the practical knowledge of local people (1998). Scott argues that these failures are more extreme in authoritarian states where civil society is weak and cannot resist or alter the imposition of state policies 'from above' (1998). Scott however does not rule out the possibility that states can play a developmental role. He argues that in order for the state to be so that it requires a democratic society where civil society has the strength to modify and alter state policies and programs and adapt them to local realities (1998). Evans

also does not claim that state action will always be developmental either, highlighting failed as well as successful cases. Ultimately Evans and Scott arrive at similar conclusions: that without the protagonism of civil society, developmental state actions and policies are unlikely to succeed.

There is a growing body of literature on state-society synergy and the co-production of public policies, promoting synergy between the state and non-state or civil society entities to implement particular policies and deliver public services (Ostrom 1996; Evans 1996; Mitlin 2008; Vaillancourt 2009). One insight of these models centers on the role of ‘social capital’, which has also been recognized by mainstream development institutions such as the World Bank (Fox and Gersham 2000; Martinez 2006). I would argue that in order for these models to work, an equitable distribution of power is a precondition, which the neoliberal interpretations have downplayed. As Kay argues, “It is an illusion to think that by attempting to mobilize via public policy, or other means, the social capital of the poor a way can be found out of poverty. I do not deny that under certain circumstances, such as with a progressive reformist or revolutionary State, it is possible to develop a positive state–society synergy that benefits the rural poor. However, proponents of social capital generally do not advocate the radical political mobilization of the rural poor.” (2006: 462-463). Advocates of FS would likely agree that social capital, or dense social ties, is a key element in the bottom-up or communitarian autonomous development strategies that FS favors. The question that Kay raises about power is key though because in order for such strategies to be sustainable in the long-term, power and assets need to be distributed more equally. The role of national states is very important in this sense for the provision of universal public services and for the redistribution of wealth and other assets through progressive taxation. In the context of neoliberalism, the achievement of such a state requires the kind of political mobilization that Kay mentions and this leads back to the relationship between of social power and mobilization and state power. The question of state-society relations, the developmental state and state-society synergy when taken together represent a framework for analyzing the achievement of FS principles vis-a-vis the state. I don’t pretend that any of these elements are easy for FS movements to achieve. In this sense, achieving FS through the state may be an elusive goal. However I believe that taken together provide a useful framework for analyzing the achievement of greater FS vis-à-vis the state.

FS has emerged as one of the most concrete political programs of the global justice movement advocating alternatives to neoliberal globalization and this surely explains its widespread appeal. With the shift towards post-neoliberal politics and governance in Latin America, FS has been incorporated in political and policy discourse in several countries. The Ecuadorian case is one of these few attempts in the world to institutionalize FS principles into state policies and programs. In Ecuador during the neoliberal period, there was an absence of the state in particular areas of social and economic life and the hallmark of the Citizen’s Revolution has

been the return and expansion of the state. Perhaps more than anything else, the government's project of socialism of *buen vivir* can be most closely identified with the 'return of the state' in terms of planning and regulation of the economy. This was also what rural social movements had been demanding during the neoliberal years, as they viewed control of the state as the only means of challenging neoliberalism (Becker 2011). As I will explore in the next two sections, the return of the developmental state in Ecuador has transformed national politics and the relationship between the state and campesino organizations as well as the question of how FS principles are to be achieved.

The Citizen's Revolution and the Politics of Post-Neoliberalism in Ecuador

The institutionalization of FS into the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, and through subsequent laws and programs, came about because of the particular political conjuncture in Ecuador in the mid-2000s. FS was one demand amongst others that social movements in Ecuador had been pushing for since the beginning of the neoliberal period in the 1980s as part of the broader opposition to neoliberalism (Silva 2009). Ecuador has clearly moved in beyond the neoliberalism of the Washington Consensus years under the Correa government, though the new model of development is very much in construction and is contested. The 'return of the state' has had a complex impact on state-society relations and the rise of Correa's political party Alianza Pais (AP) has changed the relationship between the state and social movements. In this section, I will analyze the social and political origins of the Citizen's Revolution; why and how FS was institutionalized into the 2008 Constitution; the government's new model of "buen vivir socialism" and the political context in which rural social movements find themselves in under post-neoliberalism in Ecuador.

The discourse of national sovereignty that is employed by the government of President Rafael Correa is used, amongst other things, to re-valorize the state as a vehicle for an anti-neoliberal political and economic projectⁱⁱ. The discourse of sovereignty in the context of post-neoliberalism thus plays a similar role as sovereignty in FS; recuperating national self-determination and control over the Ecuadorian territory that was restricted by neoliberal globalization and international financial institutions. The most important two ways in which the Ecuadorian state has reclaimed its economic sovereignty are the renegotiation of royalty schemes for oil with the private sector and the renegotiation and significant of the country's foreign debts. Both of these measures have generated a significant amount of new public revenue to invest in a huge expansion of public spending. Correa was first elected in 2006 after gaining political profile when he was appointed interim Minister of Economy in the transitional government of Alfredo Palacio in 2005. During the 2006 campaign he positioned himself as an outsider and against the political class or *partidocracia*. In this campaign he ran for President with a party, instead creating an electoral movement or platform called Alianza PAIS (AP),

standing for “proud and sovereign homeland”. From the beginning of his first campaign, Correa had an uneasy relationship with social movements; in particular with the main national indigenous organization, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), which is linked to the indigenous left political party Patchakutik.

Correa clearly has leftist convictions but, as a professor and academic economist for most of his career, he did not come from a background of social movement or left politics. This is in contrast to other new left leaders such as Lula da Silva of Brazil, Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela or Evo Morales of Bolivia, who all came to politics as social movement or union leaders. As a result, Correa has led a more technocratic government with fewer links to institutionalized movements and parties than has been the case under some of the other new left governments in Latin America. Several linkages to civil society and established political parties are important in explaining Correa’s rise to power though. When Correa first ran for office in 2006, he did so without a slate of candidates but with the support of the small left-wing Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE). The Federation of Indigenous, Peasant and Black Organizations (FENOCIN), which is the largest national peasant federation in Ecuador and is incidentally a constituent member of the PSE, has therefore supported Correa since 2006. The FENOCIN is a member of the Latin American Coordinating Body of Rural Organizations (CLOC) at the regional level and LVC at the global level. Correa’s base of support is clearly broad and cross-class if one considers the margins of victory he was secured in elections he has fought since 2006; he secured 57% of the popular vote in the runoff election in November, 2006 and 57% in the first round in February, 2013. The leadership of the Correa government is drawn from a mix of academics, middle-class professionals with backgrounds in the NGO and development world and a smaller number of social movement leaders and leaders from older left parties, such as the PSE. In the 2013 election, there were political groups that have criticized the government from the left, in particular Patchakutik and the Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD) who ran a slate of candidates against Correa in 2013 with former Correa-ally Alberto Acosta as the Presidential candidate. These parties supported Correa at crucial moments in the first days of his government in 2007 when he did not have many deputies in Congress. I believe that the role of these parties as well as pressure from CONAIE and FENOCIN helps to explain the institutionalization of FS as well as other concepts such as plurinationalism and the social and solidarity economy into the 2008 constitution.

The linchpin of Correa’s anti-neoliberal political platform and program in the 2006 election was his promise to hold a constituent assembly to re-write the country’s constitution, following a similar process as the constitutional assembly processes in Venezuela and Bolivia. The constituent assembly was viewed as key to the re-founding of the nation and as serving as a basis to reverse neoliberal economic policies (Conaghan and de la Torre 2008: 271). Correa

attained a vote of 82% in favor of holding a constituent assembly in April 2007 and the constituent assembly began to function in November after elections for delegates to the constituent assembly in which AP members won 80 of the 130 seats in the assembly, effectively giving Correa's party control over the writing of the new constitution. It is important to place the new Constitution within the context of the political and social forces in Ecuador in the 1990s and 2000s that were the driving forces in opposition to neoliberal policies and advocates of alternatives. As Marc Becker argues, the 1980s was a "lost decade" for Latin America in terms of economic growth and social indicators, but was a "gained decade" for social movement organization in Ecuador and across the region (2011: 26). Though a wide variety of social movements emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, the most powerful of all was the indigenous movement which burst onto the scene in June, 1990, with an uprising that shut down parts of the country for up to a week (Becker 2011: 25). The influence of indigenous and other social movements in Ecuador served to popularize a public sentiment with a structural critique of society and opposition to neoliberalism that Correa then articulated in the 2006 elections. The constituent assembly has been described as the culmination of these struggles through the institutionalization of historical anti-neoliberal and transformational demands into the constitution.

The CONAIE and other national social movement organizations as well as the parties to the left of the government, MPD and Patchakutik, were largely supportive of the government during its first year and into the 2008 constituent assembly. Social movement organizations also participated widely in the elaboration of the new constitution through different tribunals and committees on particular issues and policy areas, which explains why many long-time demands were included in the new constitution. Some of the highlights of the 2008 constitution include education, healthcare and other public services as defined as rights; the declaration of Ecuador as a plurinational and intercultural state; the banning of genetically modified organisms (GMOs); the recognition of the rights of nature; the commitment to support the social and solidarity economy and the commitment that the state should guarantee food sovereignty (Constitution of Ecuador 2008). I believe that FS was included in the constitution because of both the support and pressure of various campesino and indigenous organizations in the lead to and during the constituent assembly and because of the political alliances that helped bring the Correa government to power. During the constituent assembly a grouping called the *Mesa Agraria* was formed, which was a group of a number campesino and indigenous organizations in Ecuador which presented proposals for specific changes in rural development and agricultural policy. Much of the text included in the constitution and the sections on FS, agriculture and rural development came out of the participation of these groups in the constituent assembly. As Marc Becker notes, though CONAIE and FENOCIN often came to heads over different issues, such as plurinationalism which is favored by CONAIE but not

FENOCIN, they worked together to pressure for the inclusion of FS into the constitution and form a common front on issues during the constituent assembly process (2011: 151). Another explanatory factor was the official support of the FENOCIN, LVCs constituent organization in Ecuador, of Correa's party. The political alliance between Correa and the FENOCIN, secured in part because of Correa's early alliance with the PSE, certainly helped to secure votes for Correa amongst FENOCIN's rank and file. This may have led Correa and AP leaders to oblige the FENOCIN by including FS in the constitution.

The government's official ideology and program is *buen vivir* socialism. Though the government has deviated from many of the principles of *buen vivir* established in the constitution in terms of political decisions and policy implementation, *buen vivir* has been central to the political discourse of the Correa government. The government named the country's national development the Plan Buen Vivir (PBV) for example. *Buen vivir* is a concept from the Andean indigenous cosmivision. It is certainly a heterogeneous concept, but in general terms it establishes the purpose of social and economic life as 'living well' rather than accumulation or material consumption (Acosta 2011; Macas 2011). In this sense, *buen vivir* is an implicit critique the Western conception of development as material progress through economic growth. In the 2009-2013 PBV, the Ecuadorian government defines "*buen vivir*" as "...based on a vision that surpasses the narrow confines of quantitative economicism and challenges the notion of material, mechanical and endless accumulation of goods. Instead the new paradigm promotes an inclusive, sustainable, and democratic economic strategy; one that incorporates actors historically excluded from the capitalist, market-driven logic of accumulation and (re)distribution" (Government of Ecuador 2009: 6). Alberto Acosta was an early ally, former Minister in the Correa government and president of the constituent assembly. His role in the early years of the government and the constituent assembly help to explain the inclusion of *buen vivir* in the constitution and in the government's political discourse. Acosta has written extensively on the concept and states that the concept of "*buen vivir*" cannot be understood in the same sense of development or progress in the western sense, since "...the concept of development did not exist in indigenous societies..." but states that the intention of the project of *buen vivir* is..."not to negate the possibility to appropriate the modernization of society particularly the logic of many valuable technological advances" and emphasizes adapting the principles of *buen vivir* to new realities (2010: 13). Acosta resigned as head of the constituent assembly in June 2008 before the process had been concluded and was replaced by another member of AP. Correa has attacked him for being too deliberative and slow in drafting the constitution (Becker 2011: 141). Thereafter, Acosta broke with the government and with AP. I believe that Acosta's key role in the drafting of the constitution and his linkages with social movements is an important factor in explaining how *buen vivir* was institutionalized in the 2008 constitution and became central to the government's political and policy discourse. The discourse of *buen vivir* has been wholly adopted by the government though. Even in policy

documents the government questions the western Eurocentric model of ‘development’ based on accumulation and materialism in favor of an alternative ‘good life’ with roots in this Andean cosmology. Observers have criticized the government for essentially reviving state-led development in the name of *buen vivir* socialism (Escobar 2010; Walsh 2011; North 2013). In practice, the economic strategy of the government has been one of encouraging economic growth based on the exploitation of natural resources to increase public revenues.

While the Correa government employs the discourse of *buen vivir* it has identified itself with the project of twenty-first century socialism proposed by Hugo Chavez. Twenty-first century socialism has been under defined by politicians such as Correa, Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez and is thus more of a rhetorical device than a specific program (Becker 2011:116). At the same time, there are some important theoretical ideas behind the concept. This new socialism has been conceptualized as a departure from twentieth-century socialism by political theorist Heinz Dietrich, largely in the sense that it will need to be more democratic, pluralist and less top-down than the ‘actually existing socialisms’ of the twentieth century (Marcano 2007). Correa has refused to put a label on his socialism, other than that he is for an Ecuadorian socialism. However he has also stated that his socialism rejects wholesale nationalizations and state control of the economy, that socialism should not be dogmatic and should be conceptualized in terms of principles rather than models (2011: 116-117). It is clear that in conceptual terms the socialism professed by Correa in particular rejects much of the Marxist program of the twentieth century. Those on the contemporary Marxist left don’t view the Correa or Morales government in Bolivia as moving towards socialism the Marxist sense (Lebowitz 2006; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer 2009; Webber 2011). Other authors have proposed that we might consider the twenty-first century socialist governments as experiments in “radical social democracy”, which does seem a more approximate classification since these governments are essentially reformist but believe in a central role for the state in the economy and have proposed new ways of structuring state-society relations that could be considered “radical” (Lievesley and Ludlam 2009). Motta notes that the social democracy of these governments can be considered ‘radical’ when their policies “...go beyond [traditional] social democratic notions of state-society and state-market relationships” as the case of the participatory democracy of the communal councils in Venezuela exemplifies (2009: 75). Hugo Chavez defined twenty-first century socialism as needing to be “...more humanistic, more pluralistic, and less dependent on the state”, which does speak to the proposal to construct a model which is more pluralist and transcendent of what Motta refers to as traditional state-market and state-society relationships in social democracy (Becker 2011: 117). This sentiment about pluralism has been echoed by Alberto Acosta echoes this sentiment when he states that *buen vivir* socialism encompasses implies “civilizing” or using state capacity to regulate the market and making state apparatuses more “civic” and participatory. (2010: 13). However, while in theoretical or conceptual terms Correa, Chavez and their brain trusts have

conceptualized a new model of socialism that is more pluralist and less centralist, both politicians have relied on, “...strong governmental control in order to advance their political agendas.” (Becker 2011: 117). While the Correa government and many of its Ministries propose new programs that are more pluralist or bottom-up in some senses, such as fostering the social and solidarity economy and supporting participatory consultations to draft the PBV for example, in concrete terms the most important achievement of the government has been the return of the state in the economy and in the expanded provision of public services. In Ecuador, the terminology or idea of socialism is animating the return of the developmental, regulatory and managerial functions of the state in the economy and the expansion of the public sector throughout the country.

The return of the state and dawning of post-neoliberalism in Ecuador has had a profound impact on the relationship between the state and civil society in the current political landscape of the country. Correa is the first president in more than a decade that finished their first term without it being interrupted by popular unrest or rebellion. The 1990s were characterized by such contentious politics as a means of rejecting neoliberal measures. By 2006, many Ecuadorians were tired of political instability and have credited Correa’s government with the return of political and economic stability to the country. The return of the state in terms of expanded public services is viewed positively by many social movements in Ecuador, even if they are opposed to the way in which Correa has centralized power in the executive and many other policies of the government. Running against Correa as Presidential candidate from the left the 2013 elections, Alberto Acosta maintained the expansion of social programs and the reversal of many neoliberal policies have been positive steps taken by the government even though he and other social movements are opposed to the government’s neo-extractivist policies of expanding mining and oil extractionⁱⁱⁱ.

Rural social movements have been disarticulated since the Correa government came to power though and I believe that there are several key causes behind this. First off, there is a sense that some of the demands social movements during the neoliberal period, in particular the return of the state and reversal of orthodox neoliberalism, have been met. Public investment and investment has expanded greatly under the Correa government, with investment in social welfare policies increasing from \$147 for each Ecuadorian in 2006 to \$446 in 2011 (SENPLADES 2012: 49).^{iv} To paraphrase a leader of the Union Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabi (UPOCAM), many important long-time demands of the organization have been met under the Correa government^v. The boom in investment in highways and infrastructure in the province, increased investments in public healthcare and education, and the return of the role of the state in regulating the economy were all long-time demands of the organization^{vi}. For example, members of the UPOCAM participated in a campaign to close down the U.S. military base in the city of Manta, Manabi in 2007, a demand from social movements that was met by

the government when it eventually did not renew the contract for the U.S. military base. Recuperating state capacity, increasing investment in public services and the increased role of the state in the economy are all thus points of agreement between the Correa government and his critics on the left and in social movements. The critical question is how this increased state capacity is used and how increased public investment is actually being spent. In the face of criticism that the government has not done enough on rural development, the government also readily admits that it has a 'debt' to rural and agricultural investments and that in the current term it will focus more investments in agriculture and rural development to generate a so-called "agrarian revolution" which perhaps helps to assuage activists as it appears there is political will to facilitate further change^{vii}.

A second cause of the relative disarticulation of rural social movements is been that many leaders have in one way or another been incorporated into the state or into the government. For example the president of the FENOCIN in 2006, Pedro de la Cruz became a national assembly member for AP. The FENOCIN has maintained a policy of support of the Correa government right through to the most recent 2013 election, even though de la Cruz himself and the organization and its members have been critical of specific policies of the government, for example on the President's musings to amend the constitution to permit GMOs in the country. De la Cruz was first a national member of the assembly and is now a member of the assembly of the Andean Parliament. His participation in the government as a prominent indigenous and social movement leader is certainly important, but his entrance into politics is a phenomenon that has been replicated all over the country at the local and provincial level. Many local campesino and indigenous leaders have entered into politics as members of AP^{viii}. With the expansion of the public sector, many campesino leaders and former staff of NGOs promoting FS principles are now employed in the expanding state bureaucracy. The fact that many militants and leaders of these movements have in one way or another been incorporated into the state structure has also weakened the independent strength of the movement as well^{ix}.

Lastly, campesino organizations have historically received a significant amount of funding from European NGOs and governments'; funding that has been reduced since the 2008 crisis. This has affected the FENOCIN for example, which once received funds and had cooperation agreements with a number of different European government aid agencies and NGOs. Over the past several years because of the crisis in the European Union, the amount of dollars coming in has declined and the organization has not been able to implement new projects as a result^x. The Ecuadorian government has also taken a stronger role in governing and directing the way bilateral cooperation dollars are employed with the establishment of the Secreteria Tecnica de Cooperacion Internacional (SETECI), a government department that regulates and governs international cooperation dollars, aligning them with the policies of the government. There has also been a long time tension in peasant constituent organizations in Ecuador about whether

they should be activist organizations or should implement development projects and in this sense become more and more like NGOs. Many organizations have been doing a mix of both for years but this has perhaps undermined their functions as political and activist organizations^{xi}. In the current conjuncture it is also more difficult to find a clear issue on which to focus efforts of resistance as well. Some national organizations, in particular CONAIE, have focused on resisting the government's policy to expand mining activities, but these struggles are often highly localized and do not facilitate the kind of national organization and coordination between different social movements that the campaign against the free trade agreement with U.S. did in the early part of the 2000s for example (Hidalgo 2013: 37). To paraphrase a leader of the Federation of Popular and Campesino Organizations of Southern Ecuador (FUPOCPS), another challenge of the current conjuncture is that the government has institutionalized many of the banner slogans of the social movements, such as FS and the social and solidarity economy. At the same time, these movements still exist and are presenting criticisms of the government's policies in some cases, but their organizational capacities and the ability to mobilize large numbers of constituents has declined^{xii}.

The task of pushing the government from the outside on FS issues has been taken up by some newer national organizations. These organizations are not tied into formal politics in the way that the FENOCIN is with its alliance with the PSE or the CONAIE is to Patchakutik. At the national level, some of these groups include the National Movement of Social and Solidarity Economy (MESSE) and the Colectivo Agroecológico del Ecuador for example. There are also a number of what might be classified as progressive NGOs, such as the French NGO Agronomists and Veterinarians without Borders (AVSF), the Heifer Foundation and the Belgian NGO VECO-Andino amongst others that have been active in supporting these groups and agro-ecology. These NGOs all have that have a pro-peasant vision of rural development and agriculture and have been working in some cases for decades on promoting agro-ecology and the social and solidarity economy in Ecuador. Many of these organizations have been involved in organizing agro-ecological farmers markets, which have gained a lot of momentum in Ecuador over the past several years. These groups have been united at the national level through the Consumers working group of the Conferencia Plurinacional e Intercutlural de Soberania Alimentaria (COPISA), the national body that includes civil society representatives that has been created to develop laws and policies under the framework of FS, and the national campaign for the consumption of local and organic food, the "Que Rico Es!" campaign^{xiii}. These various organizations are some of the most politically engaged in the current period, criticizing the government's policies, particularly with its threats to change the constitution to permit GMOs in the country, but are also working with the government, or different levels of government, in various ways. The relative decline of the organizational and mobilizing capacities of rural social movements is a challenge to the achievement of greater FS though. The Correa government does not appear to have the political will to implement a policy framework that is coherent

with the principles of FS and would need to feel greater political pressure from the outside in order to do so.

Food Sovereignty and Public Policy in Ecuador

The enshrinement of FS in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution was the result of the unique political conjuncture that characterized the early years of the Correa government, in particular the constituent assembly, as well as the alliances the government had to make to consolidate power. The subsequent institutionalization of FS through various laws and the creation of new institutions and government programs to achieve greater FS have proven much more difficult and slow. Ecuador is a country which exhibits the “functional dualism” described by de Janvry (1981), which is the co-existence of various classes of campesinos with a capitalist agro-industrial sector (Carrion 2013). As Chayanov recognized nearly one hundred years ago, this duality can and does co-exist. It is estimated that between 60% and 80% of the farms in Ecuador are what would be considered peasant or family-based agriculture of one kind or another (Carrion and Herrera 2012: 161). Agriculture has increased as a percentage of real GDP in Ecuador since 1980, from 5.6% in 1980 to 8.6% in 2010 (Banco Central del Ecuador 2010, as quoted in Carrion and Herrera 2012). There has been a considerable increase the growth of non-petroleum exports since the beginning of the Correa government, from \$5.184 billion dollars US in 2006 to \$10.107 billion dollars US in 2012, a significant amount of this is represented by primary and agricultural goods (MRECI 2013: 4). This suggests that export agriculture and agribusiness (broccoli, shrimp, roses and cacao amongst others) has expanded in Ecuador under the Correa government^{xiv}. However, as Carrion and Herrera demonstrate, the incomes of campesinos have deteriorated in the last thirty years in real terms, so this growth has not necessarily benefited campesinos (2012: 159). Agro-industry in Ecuador has much more political and economic power and historically government policies have generally favored this sector. This tendency has continued with many of the policies of the present period. At the same time there are some policies and programs that have been implemented that could be considered in line with the principles of FS. There are also a number of policies that benefit small-scale producers and represent the increased role or ‘return’ of the state but do not reflect as clearly the principles of FS.

When considering the institutionalization of FS, it is useful to conceptualize FS in terms of the integral agrarian reform (IAR) paradigm that has been advanced by LVC and its constituent organizations (Torrez 2011). LVC and several other international NGOs have been involved in conceptualizing a framework for agrarian reform that is broader than just the redistribution of land and considers agrarian reform in a holistic sense. Torrez argues that IAR, “... encompasses policies of redistribution, just, equitable access and control of natural, social and productive resources (credit, appropriate technologies, health, education, social security etc.) by peasants

and their families... that development policies should be based on agro-ecological strategies centered on family and peasant agriculture and artisanal fishing; trade policies that oppose dumping of products in the market and favor peasant and family farm production oriented towards local, national and international markets; and public policies in the areas of education, health and infrastructure for the countryside that complement trade and other policies.” (Torrez 2011: 49). Along similar lines, Hidalgo (2013) has also identified elements that would represent a policy framework for FS principles in Ecuador. Hidalgo emphasizes the need for diversification of production; reducing dependency on imports; policies to foster small and medium-scale agriculture; the prevention of speculation and monopolistic economic activities in the agricultural sector; the strengthening mechanisms for commercialization that promote fair trade for campesinos and redistributive policies for access to water and land (Hidalgo 2013: 40). It is useful to keep Hidalgo’s suggestions and the IAR framework in mind when analyzing the various agricultural and rural development policies that have been implemented by the Correa government as there are many elements that are not apparent in the government’s, though there are some elements that are.

Since the adoption of FS into the Ecuadorian Constitution in 2008 there have been a number of actions taken by the state to implement policies for FS. In 2009, the government passed the Law of Food Sovereignty. This law created the COPISA, which is an arms-length body that is housed in the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP), but is made up of representatives elected from civil society .The COPISA has drafted several different proposals for laws stemming from the broader Law of Food Sovereignty, which were developed with participation of civil society through workshops throughout the country. However, at the time of writing the laws that the COPISA has drafted have yet to be debated by Congress. Various government ministries and bodies have been the key institutional spaces where FS has been institutionalized into specific programs. The most important of these spaces are the Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle and Fisheries (MAGAP) and the National Institute of Popular and Solidarity Economy (IEPS). There is also a strategy at the national level that is shared between ministries and is in charge rural development policy. The government has created the national development planning ministry, the National Secretariat of Development Planning (SENPLADES) and has now launched to national development plans, the Plan Buen Vivir (PBV). Specifically in terms of rural development, the government has created a department within SENPLADES which coordinates with the Sub-Secretariat of Rural Development within the MAGAP to implement a national rural development strategy with a variety of different programs and initiatives called the Buen Vivir Rural program. All of these institutional changes represent the ‘return of the state’ in rural development in Ecuador and it is here where there could be public policies that favor FS principles.

There are a number of policies that do not exactly reflect the principles of FS, but are aimed at or are benefiting small-scale producers specifically and could improve the prospects of small producers. These policies are also important in considering the ‘return of the state’ in agriculture and rural development in symbolic as well as concrete terms. First of all, in addition to the expansion and creation of new state institutions mentioned previously, the budget of the MAGAP has increased significantly in both operating costs and investments; public investments in agriculture through MAGAP was 88 million USD in 2003 and in 2009 reached 318 million (Carrion and Herrera 2012: 56-57). As part of reversing neoliberalism, the state has invested in public infrastructure for storing basic food staples, something that the state had done in the 1970s prior to neoliberalism. The creation of the Unidad Nacional de Almacanamiento (UNA) in 2007 marked a move towards creating more national productive and storage capacity for basic staples and there are various schemes for small producers to sell to this entity (2013). The Law of Market Control establishes price controls for agricultural goods in markets, both for producers and consumers. For certain agricultural commodities, the government has established price floors, as is the case for corn, rice, bananas and milk (Roman 2013: 144). The UNA coordinates with the MAGAP to run a program to distribute Urea, a petroleum-based fertilizer, to which all producers of less than 20 hectares are eligible to receive at a subsidized rate, a policy that was brought in right after Correa was elected in 2007 (MAGAP 2013c.). The MAGAP has also established a program called Inclusive Commerce (PRONERI), which connects small-scale producer and their associations to sell their crops to large companies as well as to the UNA through annual contracts^{xv}. This program is an attempt to govern the commodity chain as prices are set in advance. In the case of the commodities for which the government has established price floors, the price is regulated by the state (Yumbla Mantilla 2011). However, the program integrates small-scale producers into agro-industrial commodity chains and mono-crop production, in this sense is quite far from the principles of FS. The government has however used the discourse of increasing national production and national food sovereignty in relation to all of these programs.

The MAGAP has expanded technical assistance through the Escuelas de la Revolucion Agraria (ERAs). The ERAs are courses offering technical assistance and extension services for small producers. According to the methodology that was established by MAGAP, the curriculum was to be self-directed by the farmers. In this sense it is possible that some of the ERAs have taught agro-ecological or more ancestral methods, however the general impression of most people of the ERAs is that they have not reached that many producers and the agronomists who work for the MAGAP are all trained in conventional methods, since agro-ecology is still marginalized within university curriculums in the country^{xvi}. The government has implemented a program to redistribute some land to campesinos through the Plan Tierras, which not only redistributes land, but also helps campesinos get title to land to which they do not have title to. As of March

20013, the government has redistributed 20.524 Hectares benefiting 4020 families, which is quite modest (MAGAP 2013a.). There has been a significant expansion of public credit available to producers of all sizes through the national development bank the Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF). The BNF has historically been criticized for catering to agri-business and also for the barriers small and medium producers have in meeting the requirements for accessing credit. Under the Correa government the BNF has established new lines of credit that are targeted specifically at small-scale producers though. These include lines for commercialization, seeds and nurseries, irrigation, cattle, lines for coffee, cacao and fisheries (BNF 2012). There is also a general campesino line to be taken out by an association and all of these other credits have a lower interest rate for producers that are members of a cooperative or farmer's association, a policy which demonstrates the government's bias towards encouraging the organization of producer's into associations and cooperatives. The BNF has expanded significantly however in recent years, opening up new branches in underserved rural areas. The plan of the government is to eventually establish a branch in each canton (a rural county) of the country^{xvii}. It has also been discussed that the BNF will be renamed a rural development bank, though this has not yet been publicly announced and it is unclear how this would change the internal operations of the institution.

There are a number of programs that I would argue do reflect FS principles or at least have potential to advance such principles. There are many ways by which the Ecuadorian government is promoting the formation associations and cooperatives through various public institutions and programs. The government is also more closely regulating this sector, decertifying cooperatives and associations that exist only on paper or do not have legal status. In Ecuador, the FS movement and framework is closely related to the social and solidarity economy or as it is called in Ecuador, the popular and solidarity economy (Corragio 2011). There has been an institutionalization of this concept as well and it has an important relationship with FS, as FS tends to favor the cooperative organization of small producers. The government has created the IEPS as the main government ministry responsible for fostering the social and solidarity economy. The main functions of the IEPS are the regulation of this sector, the extension of micro-credits and to provide capacity building. The IEPS has also developed a program to foster public procurement from small-scale producer associations and cooperatives. According to the Law of Popular and Solidarity Economy (LOEPS) passed in 2011, 5% of the budget for public procurement should be reserved for this sector. The IEPS has a division for procurement from small-scale farmers to supply public institutions, in particular to the new national network of public daycares, Centros de Buen Vivir Infantil (CBVs). In other cases, such as Brazil, such programs have been identified as a key policy tool for supporting agro-ecology and have been quite successful (Burch 2013). In interviews with some of the different actors involved in this scheme, several challenges were identified including conflicts between the

associations and the public institutions over price and product variety. Recent changes in the administration of the program have also called into question the future of the program. The daycares are provided to by farmer's associations that have warehouses to aggregate supply and then transport and distribute to the daycares or other buyers. When the procurement program was established, each daycare hired staff in charge of preparing the meals for the children in the daycare onsite. The Ministry in charge of the daycares decided to change how the program was run and sub-contract the preparation of the food to an individual offsite, usually for a mother of one of the children at the daycare. This has brought into question whether the associations will be able to continue supplying the CBVs as there is no longer a centralized means of distributing the produce through the daycares and the women who have been sub-contracted to prepare the meals may choose in their homes and can buy the produce on individually^{xviii}. There have also been complaints by other producer's associations selling into this scheme that there is not enough demand by the public sector to buy what they produce and that public institutions are not following the law that establishes preferences for producer's associations and the solidarity economy and instead award contracts to conventional businesses^{xix}. These problems appear to be an example of the lack of policy coordination between government ministries and also exemplify the challenges involved in public procurement from small-scale producers. Nonetheless, it is a program that is more in line with the principles of FS. Within the MAGAP there a new department called La Coordinacion General de Redes Comerciales has been created. This department is under the Sub-Direction of Rural Development and has a philosophy that is much closer to FS principles. The department works to assist small-scale producers organized into cooperatives and associations under the principles of the social and solidarity economy and agro-ecology to directly sell their products through farmer's markets and other arrangements. The department is also working with associations to develop schemes for agro-ecological certification, systems of participatory guarantee (SGPs) that are an alternative to conventional organic certification programs (MAGAP 2013b). While both of these initiatives are closer to the principles of FS, they represent a miniscule amount of the state budget however compared to all of the rural development and agricultural policies of the government.

The changes in the structure of the state under the Correa government are important to consider in relation to FS. The most significant institutional reform that has taken place is the passage of the *Codigo Organico de Ordenamiento Territorial, Autonomia y Decentralizacion* (COOTAD), a law which has re-ordered the functions of different levels of government in Ecuador, designating all sub-national governments as autonomous decentralized governments (GADs). Most significantly the COOTAD has granted new powers to the most local level of government in Ecuador, the *juntas parroquiales*. *Juntas parroquiales* have a long history in Ecuador, but prior to the COOTAD they were local representative councils that had some linkage with the municipalities. Prior to the passage of the COOTAD however, *juntas*

parroquiales were not a level of government with a budget or jurisdiction over particular policy areas. Under the COOTAD, juntas parroquiales have been granted new responsibilities and a new importance in terms of both political representation and responsibility over different policy areas including agriculture and economic development, which presents new possibilities for institutionalizing FS initiatives at this very level. The COOTAD and new division of power between governments in Ecuador could offset the centralism that has characterized the Correa government's rural development policies. However the COOTAD has not come fully into effect and there is a wide discrepancy between the capacities and political leadership of the thousands of juntas parroquiales in the country. Also, with the growth in public expenditure by the national government, some have questioned whether transfers as a percentage of the national budget to local governments have actually declined when compared with the previous decentralization law and reforms of the 1990s.^{xx}

One more complex issue is the relationship between local governments and the communal and associative non-state governance structures that characterize rural Ecuador. These organizations are often federated into regional second-tier federations, organizaciones de segundo grado (OSGs), of communal and rural social organizations (peasant associations and indigenous communities), many of which date back to the land reforms of the 1960s and 1970s or much further. Luciano Martinez argues that since the 1980s there has been a "boom" in the establishment of OSGs in Ecuador. Martinez argues that OSGs were favored by programs such as Prolocal and Prodepeine, both sponsored by the World Bank in the 1990s, as well as international aid and NGOs more broadly to implement rural development projects (2006). The WBs focus on funding projects through OSGs was the result of the 'turn' towards social capital during this period (Fox and Gersham 2000). However as Martinez argues, the projects that were funded through these programs were miniscule in relation to the needs of rural areas and they did not address the broader structural and economic problems deepened by neoliberalism (2006: 150). Martinez argues that the assumption behind the methodology of intervention of the World Bank is a slightly misguided idea of social capital based on "...an idealized vision of Andean communitarianism versus practices constantly becoming more individualistic in both families and communities." (2006: 129). Like the WB, the FS literature often also idealizes such communitarian structures as well. In Ecuador, such organizations are quite heterogeneous in their functions and capacities and may or may not have the capacity to implement projects and organize communities to achieve FS^{xxi}. During the 2008 constituent assembly, the CONAIE proposed another level of government, local community governments, that would overlap with existing communal and associative structures in the country, though this proposal was ultimately defeated (Becker 2011: 141). The question of what the future of these communal and associative structures will be in Ecuador is complicated by the granting of new powers to the juntas parroquiales, which often represent the same geographical territory as these structures. Since the beginning of the Citizen's Revolution, leaders who have come up through

the ranks within such peasant organizations have moved into formal politics as politicians in *juntas parroquiales*. Historically *comunas*, associations and OSGs have been the base of many of the programs and strategies promoting agro-ecology and the organization of social and solidarity economy initiatives such as credit unions, producer associations and cooperatives. Communitarian structures are clearly essential to the achievement FS, but the norms of reciprocity and solidarity that they embody cannot easily be scaled-up to other levels (Sandbrook 2011: 18). This is where the role of synergies with local governments could be important. Some of the more promising developments around food policies more in line with FS principles are occurring at the level of parroquial, municipal and provincial governments in Ecuador. This was noted at a gathering of the national agro-ecological movement in Riobamba in April 2013. The report from the gathering highlights that even though in general terms the state's policies contradict the principles of FS, the number of agro-ecological farmer's markets in Ecuador has expanded significantly, sometimes with the support of local governments and that there are interesting and projects being implemented at this level across the country, sometimes even with the support of MAGAP and other public institutions.^{xxii} What these observations suggest is that spaces of state-society synergy developing in Ecuador for the implementation of public policies for FS are primarily at the local level.

The institutionalization of FS in specific programs and policies in Ecuador has created some new institutional spaces to advance the FS framework, however overall the situation in the country has not changed and it appears that agro-industry has even been strengthened under the Correa government. What would an alternative policy framework more favorable to FS principles include in Ecuador? Campesino organizations have voiced criticisms of the government's policies both inside and outside of the government. As a result of the Law of Social Control and Citizen Participation, the MAGAP has created a National Campesino-Citizen Council as well as a structure that has the function of it is to give a voice to farmers within the MAGAP for dialogue on policy issues. These structures have a kind of non-binding advisory role in terms of government policies. In a recent public statement on the government's agricultural criticizing, the representatives of the council criticized the government on the following issues: many families still lack title to their land which prevents them from accessing credit; the credit policies of the BNF still largely favor agro-industry; land reform efforts (Plan Tierras) is inadequate and the political debate for a new land reform law is currently stalled; there is no technical assistance offered by the state that teaches agro-ecological techniques; there is no focused or specific support for small-scale agriculture and small-scale fisheries remain marginalized and have problems with commercialization and finally the possibility that the government will amend the constitution to permit GMOs is a concern.^{xxiii} As this list of concerns demonstrates, many of the conditions necessary for FS are still very much absent in Ecuador.

The hallmark of the Citizen's Revolution has been the return of the state in Ecuador under the guise of post-neoliberalism and this has opened up some space to move towards state policies which could provide a basis for the advancement of FS. The government has considerably increased investment in education, healthcare, social programs in rural areas as well as in credit for small producers. The investments of the Correa government in these areas are important and are an aspect of FS as the IAR framework has emphasized (Torrez 2011). However the other elements that LVC identifies as part of the IAR are clearly largely absent from the rural development and agricultural policies that have been implemented by the Correa government including the promotion of agro-ecological production techniques, significant land reform, greater access to irrigation and water and policies and schemes aimed at commercialization favorable to campesinos rather than just promoting monocultures. With the weight of agro-industry and political influence of its representatives within the MAGAP in particular, it is unlikely that the Correa government will make policies that are unfavorable to this sector. However, it is possible that Ecuador may follow the dual and 'gradualist' Brazilian model by establishing a ministry of small-scale farms or campesino agriculture outside of the MAGAP while maintaining policies for agri-business in the MAGAP. Such an institutional change is rumored as a possibly on the horizon for the MAGAP^{xxiv}. This ministry would implement more public policies that favor agro-ecology and the solidarity economy targeted specifically at small-scale producers, as has been the case in Brazil (Burch 2013). However if one thing is clear about the Brazilian case, social movements such as the MST have maintained a relative autonomy from the state while at the same time working with the state to institutionalize technical assistance programs for agro-ecology for example (Schneider 2012). In Ecuador the lack of strong autonomous social movement organizations both working independently of the state and in synergy in particular institutional spaces with the state is generally still lacking.

Conclusion

The shift in state-society relations in Ecuador has largely strengthened the power of the state vis-a-vis civil society. The consequence of the relative decline of rural social movements in Ecuador and the incorporation of local and national campesino and indigenous leaders into AP and into the expanding state bureaucracies means that there is not enough autonomous power to push the government from the 'outside' in favor of policies that reflect FS principles. At the same time, representatives of these same groups are now 'inside' the government in various positions, which means that they are able to push for the advancement of FS principles from within. It is unclear what the future holds in Ecuador, but so far it seems that the power of movements favoring FS in Ecuador has in relative terms declined. Has the re-emergence of the developmental state in Ecuador benefited movements and principles for FS? The answer I would say is also largely no. Certainly the increased public investments in healthcare, education, social services, infrastructure and some particular agricultural policies should be

applauded, as these are pre-conditions to vibrant rural communities and FS. However, the agricultural policies of the government largely encourage mono-cropping, making small producers more dependent on external inputs and markets for example. In this sense the state's policies largely miss the mark in terms of the relationship of Evans' "embedded autonomy" that would be needed with civil society that is necessary for the state to play a developmental role for FS, since in practice the state's agricultural policies have largely been opposed to the principles and practices of FS movements. The Ecuadorian case appears closer to Scott's cautionary tale of the pitfalls of the developmental state, where the strengthening of state power and relative weakness of civil society means that many policies are imposed 'from above'. Finally, although there are some interesting laws and initiatives that exist on paper in terms of making policy development and implementation more participatory, policies are generally implemented a top-down manner, so the degree of state-society synergy is also low with the exception of some promising initiatives at the level of local governments. Overall Ecuador has not followed what I laid out in the first section of the paper as a possible trajectory for the scaling-up of FS through the state.

As mentioned at the first section, it remains unclear how the conceptualization of plural sovereignties in FS, rooted in local autonomy and communitarianism, can be combined with Westphalian state sovereignty. Patel's proposal for "cosmopolitan federalism" is a constructive one as while it is essential to consider the national and the global in relation to FS; it is at local levels of the state where there is greater potential for policies to be adapted to local needs and where state-society synergies are more likely to occur (2009: 669). For example, Altieri and Nicholls (2008) have argued that the democratization of science and agricultural extension services through public policies is essential for expanding agro-ecology. This would likely be most effectively achieved working through local governments. The tension between the state and local-level non-state and communitarian spaces remains a central practical and theoretical challenge for FS though. As Claeys argues, FS is premised on the communitarian "self-legislation by citizens" which as others have argued (see second section) does little to explain how these rights could actually be enforced (2012: 851). As was mentioned in the first section, Wittman's concept of agrarian citizenship points us in this direction, as the citizenship right of campesinos and other agrarianists, "...would expect state protection for local rights to produce and protect the environment, but would also depend on local and global social networks and traditional ecological knowledge of agrarian conditions to enact those rights." (2009: 807). Communitarian and grassroots structures, characterized by practices such as the *minga* or communal labour for example, are clearly fundamental elements of agrarian citizenship in a democratic society and particularly in a plurinational country such as Ecuador (Korovkin 2001). However at this point in history, states remain the main structures through which rights are enforced and communitarian rights ultimately need to be guaranteed by the state. This is demonstrated by the long-time demand for state recognition of plurinationalism by the indigenous movement in

Ecuador for example (Korovkin 2001). Wittman’s “agrarian citizenship” ultimately arrives at this conclusion as well (2009: 807). It is thus important to consider how communitarian structures of governance are positioned in relation to the state and state power at various levels. Other scholars have recognized the need to re-think this question (North and Cameron 2000; Kay 2006: 486) and to me it seems crucial if the state is to play a developmental role for FS and guarantee the local rights associated with Wittman’s “agrarian citizenship”. There may be new kinds of state institutions or forms of organization that could serve as a basis for achieving FS principles that combine the state and communitarian forms of organization in new ways that are not yet apparent. This represents an important area for future research on FS and the state.

The shift towards post-neoliberalism and the return of the developmental state appears likely to continue at least in the short to medium term future in Latin America. Many of the elements that have been identified as preconditions to FS, such as public services, infrastructure, the redistribution of wealth and other productive assets as well as securing local rights are at this point in history still functions that national governments provide. This is why Bernstein has observed that the state remains somewhat of an “elephant in the room” for FS as no state in history has ever implemented a policy framework that reflects totally FS principles (2013: 26). The achievement of greater FS vis-s-vis the state would thus require a new kind of state. This state would need to be at once a traditional reformist developmental and social state providing public services, infrastructure and the redistribution of wealth and other productive assets to rural areas through progressive taxation. At the same time, this state would need to develop a new relationship to civil society for the implementation public policies such as the promotion of agro-ecology and for the guarantee of local rights, indigenous and communitarian sovereignties. In this paper, I hope to have highlighted some of the key theoretical and practical issues related to FS and the state through my analysis of the Ecuadorian case. I hope to have also suggested some elements in my theoretical framework for further theorization and empirical research on FS and the state. If we are reaching the limits of neoliberal globalization, then it will be necessary to rethink the relationship between the state and FS. With all the contradictions and difficulties involved in achieving FS, the idea remains a cause for hope in an unjust and uncertain world.

ⁱ The liberal perspective of Rawls (1971; 1987) favors the mediation of particular interests by the liberal state on the basis of the overlapping consensus or western liberal democratic tradition. The communitarian perspective attempts to find the basis for political legitimacy, and subsequently the basis for sovereignty, though collective or shared values (Walzer 1983; Bell 1993; Tam 1998).

ⁱⁱ President Correa’s speeches and the discourse of the government in general, are highly nationalist and draw and frequently on the language of national sovereignty and different symbols that represent this nationalism.

ⁱⁱⁱ This assertion is drawn from Alberto Acosta’s speeches throughout the 2013 campaign as well as a retrospective panel discussion on the 2013 elections on April 11, 2013 at FLACSO-Ecuador in Quito.

^{iv} The statistics of the government demonstrate significant reductions in poverty and extreme poverty in Ecuador since the Correa government was elected and in many areas public investment has increased seven or eightfold what was spent in the years prior to the election of the Correa government.

^v The UPOCAM maintains a formal political alliance with AP and one of their past President, Jorge Loor, is now an *alterno* member of the National Assembly for AP.

^{vi} Interview by author with a leader of the UPOCAM, Manabi, Ecuador, March 13th, 2013.

^{vii} This assertion is based on the campaign speeches of President Correa through the January-February 2013 election campaign.

^{viii} This assertion is based on an interview with a leader of the FUPOCPS in Loja, Ecuador February 8th, 2013 and from an interview with Pedro de la Cruz in Quito on April 6th, 2013.

^{ix} Interview by author with a leader of the FUPOCPS in Loja, Ecuador February 8th, 2013.

^x This assertion is based on an interview by the author of a long time staff and intern of the FENOCIN in Imbabura, Ecuador on March 30th, 2013.

^{xixi} This dynamic has been analyzed by Becker (2011) in the context of the indigenous movement and

^{xii} This has been confirmed in interviews by the author with several peasant leaders and in informal conversations with many individuals in Ecuador.

^{xiii} The “Que Rico Es!” campaign focuses on public education to encourage a person to buy food directly from producers and food that is produced under agroecological conditions.

^{xiv} The debate about trade and FS is not straightforward (see Burnett and Murphy 2013) Small-scale producers benefit from some of this trade in particular coffee and banana producers, though large intermediary firms are still the main beneficiaries of this increased trade.

^{xv} For a detailed analysis of the Negocios Inclusivos in Ecuador, see Yumbra Mantilla, María Rosa. 2011. Encadenamiento agroalimentario: ¿solución sustentable de desarrollo rural o consolidación del poder agroindustrial? *EUTOPIA*. 2, 115-134.

^{xvi} It has come up in many interviews that the author has conducted that the education of agronomists is a major barrier to the expansion of agro-ecological techniques in the country since most universities teach industrial and conventional practices.

^{xvii} This information was provided through an interview by the author with an employee of the BNF in Zamora, Ecuador on August 2nd, 2013.

^{xviii} This information was drawn from interviews with staff of the IEPS in Quito on June 28th, 2012 and with the director of an NGO in Loja that was involved in organizing producer’s associations to participate in the public procurement program on February 7th, 2013.

^{xix} This observation comes from an interview that the author did with a manager of one of these centers on April 12, 2013 in Imbabura, Ecuador.

^{xx} This observation comes from an interview the author did with a representative of the Consortium of Provincial Governments of Ecuador in Quito on June 26th, 2013.

^{xxi} As Luciano Martinez states in his book chapter on second-level organizations (OSGs) in Ecuador, rural OSGs are extremely heterogeneous, representing a variety of organizational forms such as indigenous communities, economic associations and cooperatives organized more for production as well as social and cultural organizations (2006: 110). Martinez argues that this heterogeneity also speaks to the fact that often OSGs don’t necessarily respond to the general interest of a given territory or to the local development priorities, but more to the interests of particular leaders or the particular interests of the base organizations that constitute OSGs . (2006: 110).

^{xxii} These observations come from the conference report of the Encuentro Campesino Agroecológico “Campo y Ciudad Unidos por la Soberanía Alimentaria”, Riobamba, Ecuador 29 y 30 de Abril 2013

^{xxiii} These suggestions came from a document presented to the MAGAP by the council Consejo Sectorial Ciudadano Campesino del MAGAP, Quito, 29 de abril de 2013. “Presidentes de los Consejos Sectoriales Provinciales del MAGAP, Presentan Agenda al Ministro.”

^{xxiv} It has come up in several interviews with the author, as well as in informal conversations, that the government is considering creating a separate ministry for campesino agriculture though to date there has been no announcement of this to date.

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FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: A CRITICAL DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES

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A fundamentally contested concept, food sovereignty has — as a political project and campaign, an alternative, a social movement, and an analytical framework — barged into global agrarian discourse over the last two decades. Since then, it has inspired and mobilized diverse publics: workers, scholars and public intellectuals, farmers and peasant movements, NGOs and human rights activists in the North and global South. The term has become a challenging subject for social science research, and has been interpreted and reinterpreted in a variety of ways by various groups and individuals. Indeed, it is a concept that is broadly defined as the right of peoples to democratically control or determine the shape of their food system, and to produce sufficient and healthy food in culturally appropriate and ecologically sustainable ways in and near their territory. As such it spans issues such as food politics, agroecology, land reform, biofuels, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), urban gardening, the patenting of life forms, labor migration, the feeding of volatile cities, ecological sustainability, and subsistence rights.

Sponsored by the [Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale University](#) and the [Journal of Peasant Studies](#), and co-organized by [Food First](#), [Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies \(ICAS\)](#) and the [International Institute of Social Studies \(ISS\)](#) in The Hague, as well as the Amsterdam-based [Transnational Institute \(TNI\)](#), the conference “Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue” will be held at Yale University on September 14–15, 2013. The event will bring together leading scholars and political activists who are advocates of and sympathetic to the idea of food sovereignty, as well as those who are skeptical to the concept of food sovereignty to foster a critical and productive dialogue on the issue. The purpose of the meeting is to examine what food sovereignty might mean, how it might be variously construed, and what policies (e.g. of land use, commodity policy, and food subsidies) it implies. Moreover, such a dialogue aims at exploring whether the subject of food sovereignty has an “intellectual future” in critical agrarian studies and, if so, on what terms.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

[Patrick Clark](#) is an associated researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO- Ecuador) in Quito, Ecuador and a PhD candidate in political science at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. He is currently completing his doctoral research on the Ecuadorian government’s rural development policies and food sovereignty. He can be contacted by email at patrick_clark@carleton.ca.