A Conversation with Alexander Evans: A Diplomat’s View of South Asia

Alexander Evans, a 2009 Yale World Fellow, is a British diplomat who until August was First Secretary Political at the British High Commission in Islamabad, Pakistan. A South Asia expert, he has focused on Pakistan�s tribal areas and Kashmir. He is also a Gwilym Gibbon Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. After graduating from the London School of Economics he worked at a variety of think-tanks including Chatham House and Policy Exchange while visiting and writing on both Pakistan and India. He also worked as a regulator, management consultant and with the UN in Afghanistan. Alexander joined the British foreign service in 2003. He has worked as a senior analyst, as a political officer at the British High Commission in New Delhi and as an advisor in the Policy Planning Staff in London. In this latter position he worked on the UK�s foreign policy strategy, Active Diplomacy for a Changing World (2006) and Prime Minister Tony Blair�s international policy review, Britain in the World (2007).

Yasmine Hafiz, Assistant to the South Asian Studies Council, had the opportunity to interview him about his life and his work

Y: You recently gave a talk sponsored by the South Asian Society on terrorism in the region. What was your stance? A: It was an interactive session trying to put terrorism into context. There is a lot of alarmist media coverage of Pakistan, portraying it as downtown Grozny or full to the brim with terrorists plotting to destroy America. If you visit Pakistan, you actually meet lots of friendly people � tea, not bullets, is the normal reception. Violence in Pakistan grabs global media headlines but that is not what Pakistan is mostly about. That being said, there are reasons why Pakistan attracts so much attention from the U.S. and the U.K. The majority of terrorism cases in the U.K. have a link to militants in Pakistan, although the causes of radicalization are usually local. Hence the UK�s relationship with Pakistan is critical to cope with and respond to the threat posed by both British and Pakistani militants. But Pakistan is also important for a wide range of other reasons: the role it plays in the Muslim world, the community links to the UK, its relationships with Afghanistan and India, economic development, narcotics, migration, and nuclear weapons.

Y: In what ways do you see a shift in the attitude of the United States towards South Asia with the advent of the Obama administration? A: There has been a high level of interest in South Asia since President Clinton�s time in office. The joke goes that India learnt to speak American and America finally woke up to India. This interest greatly increased since the mid-1990s for a number of reasons. Desis (South Asians) in the U.S. are politically active in both the Republican and Democratic parties. They are successful and influential communities and major donors. Meanwhile India�s economic potential is a major reason behind this surge of interest. Finally, Pakistan and Afghanistan have assumed enormous strategic importance post-9/11. Rather than a shift towards South Asia, President Obama is continuing an existing focus on the region � remember President Bush�s support for driving through the US-India nuclear deal. But the policy debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan persists, as can be seen in the media debate here in the U.S. about what should be done next.

Y: Do you ever envision South Asian cooperation increasing to a point that it will become similar to the European Union, and would that be beneficial? What do you think of SAARC’s (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) effectiveness? A: SAARC has taken a number of small but important steps to improve cooperation between South Asian countries, but it is a long way even from regional organizations like the European Union. South Asia is a huge market, and the potential benefits of improved cross-border trade would help all those living in the region. But there are plenty of political pitfalls on the way, not just between India and Pakistan, but also for example between India and Bangladesh. But there are positive examples of what can be done � for example, the Punjab-Punjab economic links forged across the India-Pakistan border. The more cross-border trade, eased by infrastructure and treaties, the more wealth can be created across the region � rather than in the Gulf, where so much of the value of indirect trade between India and Pakistan now ends up.

Y: What is the public perception of the Taliban within Pakistan? A: There is little support for the �Talibanization of Pakistan� and the Pakistan Taliban. However, there is widespread distrust of the current Afghan government, as well as opposition to the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan. This mixed response can sometimes translate into sympathy for the Afghan Taliban. Many Pakistanis feel that Western forces should not be in Afghanistan, though this is not the position of the Pakistani government. As far as their view of the Pakistani Taliban, most Pakistanis are conservative rather than Islamist, an important distinction. Religious parties win few seats in elections. The vast majority of Pakistanis would rather have Pakistan follow the model of Malaysia or Turkey than live in a regime under the Taliban. The latest wave of terrorist attacks in Peshawar, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad can only further strengthen anti-Taliban sentiments.

Y: What are the role of madrasahs in Pakistan? A: Madrasahs are religious schools. Most madrasahs are not producing terrorists. They are not jihad factories or schools of hate, but institutions that have positive and negative aspects (like other institutions). We need to put them in context - there are some madrasahs at which violent radicals are based. But would it be reasonable to shut down all North American schools just because some of them produce wackos? The problem with the debate about madrasahs is that most commentators are not looking at the evidence, the facts of the matter. Instead, sensational headlines about madrasahs are written by people who should know better. A more scientific approach is needed that collects data and engages with data, not opinion, including detailed statistical work. At the moment, we have lots of assertions and not much evidence, but we need more evidence and less assertion.

Y: How are Afghan refugees changing the fabric of Pakistani society? A: It’s a really interesting issue. There are several million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and this presence has at times been a hot political issue within the country. A lot of Pakistanis blame problems like crime on the presence of the refugees. Pakistan has been fairly generous by welcoming large numbers of Afghans into Pakistan. Much of this migration is driven by economics rather than politics, as there are better employment opportunities in Pakistan. Fortunately, both governments are cooperating much more effectively on the issue of refugees than they have in the past, and the challenge that the issue had previously posed to bilateral relations has fallen. Pakistan has also had a refugee crisis of its own with recent events in the Swat Valley, with many displaced people moving away from the fighting.

Y: How would you characterize the present and future relationship between India and Pakistan? A: India and Pakistan have an incredibly complicated relationship. The irony is that both Delhi and Islamabad are Punjabi cities with similar food, humor, and culture � just look at the mutual interest in film and music. On the flip side, they sometimes think they understand each other perfectly when they might not do so at all. Misperceptions in the bilateral relationship are always a risk. Though relations have been improving between India and Pakistan, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks were a major impediment to moving forward. If another terrorist attack in India with links to Pakistani groups occurs, it could seriously destabilize relations between the two countries. The dynamic between Pakistan and India is one of the central relationships in foreign affairs that matters.

Y: Is Pakistan �obsessed with an India threat?� A: A lot of Pakistan’s grand strategy revolves around a worldview that is shaped by the presence of a large neighbor called India. The issue is not so much whether it is right or wrong to focus on that neighbor, but that India is perceived as a rival and a threat to Pakistani national security, which in turn affects decisions taken in Islamabad. In recent years, Pakistan has been changing to pay more attention to internal threats, including that posed by Al-Qaeda and militants from the Tribal Areas.

Y: What led you to South Asia? A: Serendipity. I went to Nepal and India when I was eighteen, and I also visited the Kashmir Valley at that time. From then on, I was fascinated with South Asia. I genuinely enjoy times when I am living and working in the region, from talking to businesspeople in Karachi to exploring southern Bangladesh.

Y: What lies ahead for you? A: After Yale I will be returning to the British Foreign Service, but on loan to the U.S. State Department in Washington D.C. There I will be working as an advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I also plan to continue writing and researching on South Asia when I spend time at Oxford.