To Remain in the EU or Not to Remain: That is the Question for British Voters
After 30 hours of non-stop negotiation last Thursday and Friday, the 27 other heads of state and government of the European Union and British Prime Minister David Cameron agreed on the terms of a “new settlement” for the United Kingdom – one he and they hope will persuade a majority to vote in favor of remaining in the EU in the referendum scheduled for June 23.
The “new settlement” was the culmination of an effort Cameron began in January 2013 when he pledged that if the Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 election he would renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership in the EU and hold an in-out referendum on membership by the end of 2017. It was, he said, “time for the British people to have their say. It is time for us to settle this question about Britain and Europe.”
But of course it was not just about resolving Britain’s longstanding ambivalence about Europe. It was also about the 2015 election. Presiding over a Conservative Party that has long been deeply divided over Europe, sharing power with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, and facing a growing threat of defections of Conservative members of Parliament and voters to Nigel Farage’s xenophobic and euroskeptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Cameron’s pledge was motivated, above all, by his desire to secure a Tory majority in the 2015 election.
The “new settlement” addresses UK concerns in four areas – economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and social benefits and free movement. Regarding economic governance, the leaders agreed that measures to deepen Economic and Monetary Union will be voluntary for non-euro members, that the EU institutions will ensure a level playing field for all member states in the single market, that EU law regarding the banking union applies only to financial institutions located in states that are in the euro area, and that the supervision of financial institutions and markets in non-euro countries is the responsibility of those countries.
Regarding sovereignty, the leaders recognized that, notwithstanding the commitment in the treaties to achieving an “ever closer union,” the UK is not committed to further political integration into the EU and agreed to make it clear in the next revision of the treaties that ambition does not apply to the UK. What was left unsaid was that the UK could, of course, prevent any move toward a closer union by refusing to agree to a treaty or amendment that would have that effect.
Perhaps the most important – and most contested – aspect of the “new settlement” involves its provisions regarding social benefits and free movement. The leaders agreed that the right of free movement of workers from one member state to another can be limited on various grounds including “overriding reasons of public interest” such as averting the risk of undermining the sustainability of social security systems. Toward that end, they agreed that the Commission will propose legislation to create an “alert and safeguard mechanism” that would allow member states to notify the Commission and Council of an exceptional situation that affects essential aspects of the social security system, including the in-work benefits system, and would allow the member state for a period of seven years to restrict the access of newly-arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefits for a period of up to four years.
The leaders also agreed the Commission will submit a proposal to amend an existing regulation that would index the child benefits paid to other member states for the children who remain in the home state of workers who have migrated to another EU member state to the standard of living and benefit level of the home state. Until 2020, the legislation would apply only to new claims made by EU workers in the host member state; thereafter, it would apply to all such benefits. The UK currently spends roughly £30 million a year on such benefits, roughly the amount it spends for research on driverless cars.
Cameron crowed that the “new settlement” gives the UK a “special status in a reformed EU.” But in fact it does neither; the UK has had from the beginning a special status in the EU, epitomized by its late entry in 1973, Margaret Thatcher’s successful use of her handbag to obtain a substantial annual rebate of a portion of its fiscal contribution, its refusal to participate in the European Monetary System until 1990, its opt-out from the EMU and the euro, and its refusal to join the Schengen area.
And the “new settlement” certainly does not reflect any significant reform of the EU. The only way substantial and fundamental change in the EU can occur is through negotiation of a new treaty or amendments to the existing treaties and Angela Merkel and the other leaders made it absolutely clear at the start of Cameron’s campaign that negotiation of a new treaty or amendment of the existing treaties was off the table. After Brussels, any such negotiation remains off the table.
The rhetorical commitments regarding economic governance, competitiveness, and sovereignty will perhaps provide some comfort to British euroskeptics. And the provisions for limiting, in certain circumstances, the flow of migrants from other EU states will no doubt be welcome in a country that has roughly two million workers from other EU member states, including more than 850,000 from Poland and almost 200,000 from Romania. But the “new settlement” does not constitute a reform, fundamental or otherwise, of the EU.
It’s perhaps not surprising, then, that Cameron immediately confronted a firestorm of Tory opposition to the “new settlement” when he returned from Brussels. At a long Cabinet meeting Saturday morning, at least six ministers – among them Michael Gove, the Justice Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, a former leader of the party and the minister for work and pensions, and Chris Grayling, the Leader of the House of Commons – told him and their colleagues they would support the “Leave” option in the June referendum. And on Sunday, Boris Johnson, the highly visible and vocal Mayor of London (and a potential future leader of the party), announced that he too would support the “Leave” option as will roughly 40 per cent of the Conservative M.P.s.
Will a majority of those voting on June 23 support the “Leave” option? Probably not; recent polls have given the “remain” option a slim majority in the range of 51-52 per cent, the government will campaign very hard for a “remain” vote, portray the “new settlement” as a great triumph, and emphasize the fearful economic and security consequences of a Brexit. And as tempting as it may be, substantial numbers of Labour, Scottish Nationalist, and Liberal Democrat voters will resist the temptation of handing Cameron and his government a humiliating defeat and will vote to remain in the EU. But it will no doubt be an interesting campaign.
David Cameron is a professor of political science and the director of the MacMillan Center’s European Union Studies Program at the MacMillan Center.